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ABSTRACT. Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (SAON) implies a system of different sensors that are generating 
data to be preserved, interpreted, and applied in a continuous manner over a long period on a pan-Arctic scale. This note 
summarizes the current institutional framework that relates to data generation and use, as well as decision making and 
operational responses, around the Arctic Ocean. Sustainable solutions will necessarily involve those institutions that have 
the financial, logistic, policy, and legal capacity to support infrastructure in the Arctic Ocean region into the future. Three 
options are introduced for supporting SAON as a key element of the sustainable Arctic Ocean infrastructure that governments 
and Indigenous peoples hope to develop. Option 1 would be for the Arctic coastal states to mandate that a portion of leasehold 
payments from energy companies be earmarked for general-purpose infrastructure development in the Arctic Ocean 
region, with specific inclusion of SAON. Option 2 would be for the Arctic Council, as the high-level forum for international 
cooperation in the Arctic, to spread the burden of supporting SAON among the Arctic states, non-Arctic states, and Indigenous 
peoples. Option 3 would be to support SAON through coordinated public-private partnerships among diverse organizations 
and institutions with Arctic remits. Compelling justification for supporting SAON is that it is needed to inform decision 
making about both sustainable infrastructure development and maritime domain awareness for commercial operations in the 
Arctic Ocean. 
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RÉSUMÉ. Les réseaux Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (SAON, ou réseaux d’observation durables de l’Arctique) 
sont dotés d’un système de capteurs différents qui produisent des données à stocker, à interpréter et à appliquer de manière 
continue sur une longue période, à l’échelle panarctique. Cette communication résume le cadre institutionnel actuel faisant le 
lien entre la production des données et leur utilisation, et fait état de la prise de décisions et des interventions opérationnelles 
relatives à l’océan Arctique. Les solutions durables feront nécessairement appel aux établissements qui possèdent la capacité 
financière, logistique, politique et juridique de soutenir l’infrastructure dans la région de l’océan Arctique à l’avenir. Trois 
options sont présentées pour appuyer les réseaux SAON en tant qu’élément-clé de l’infrastructure durable de l’océan Arctique 
que les gouvernements et les peuples indigènes espèrent aménager. La première option ferait en sorte que les états côtiers 
de l’Arctique mandateraient qu’une partie des versements à bail de la part des sociétés du secteur de l’énergie soit affectée 
à l’aménagement de l’infrastructure générale dans la région de l’océan Arctique, ce qui comprendrait les réseaux SAON. 
La deuxième option viserait à ce que le Conseil de l’Arctique, cette tribune de collaboration internationale de premier plan 
dans l’Arctique, répartisse le fardeau de soutenir les réseaux SAON entre les états arctiques, les états non arctiques et les 
peuples indigènes. La troisième option consisterait à faire appuyer les réseaux SAON par des partenariats coordonnés entre 
divers organismes et établissements du secteur public et du secteur privé pour que des remises soient faites dans l’Arctique. 
La justification permettant de convaincre de la nécessité de soutenir les réseaux SAON est que l’existence des réseaux s’avère 
nécessaire pour informer la prise de décisions relatives aux aménagements d’infrastructures durables et à la sensibilisation au 
domaine maritime en vue de la réalisation d’activités commerciales dans l’océan Arctique. 
Mots clés : holistique; infrastructure; établissements; options; panarctique; durabilité
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental State-Change in the Arctic Ocean
The Arctic Ocean had been characterized by sea ice accret-
ing over many years and then persisting year-round as 
part of an environmental process repeated for millennia 
(Overpeck et al., 2005; Stickley et al., 2009). In fact, until 
the 21st century, the Arctic Ocean was covered mostly by 
multi-year sea ice, in contrast to the Southern Ocean around 
Antarctica, where first-year sea ice predominates. This situ-
ation has changed. 
The Arctic Ocean is now dominated by open water dur-
ing the summer and first-year sea ice during the winter 
90 • P.A. BERKMAN
(Fig. 1a, b). Within the past three decades, the Arctic Ocean 
has been transformed from a sea with a permanent sea-ice 
cap to a seasonally ice-free sea with sea ice shrinking to its 
minimum extent in September and growing to its maximum 
extent in March (Berkman, 2012). Rather than projecting 
forward to the mid-21st century, when the Arctic Ocean 
may be open water across the North Pole, we can see that 
the system has already crossed a threshold, with more than 
50% of the sea ice newly forming each year (Fig. 1a). Like a 
fertile land area becoming a desert, or a glacier becoming a 
mountain valley, the Arctic Ocean is experiencing an envi-
ronmental state-change in which the boundary conditions 
and dynamics of the system are fundamentally replaced. 
Without its permanent sea-ice cap, the Arctic Ocean effec-
tively is a new system. 
Unparalleled access to the Arctic Ocean is awaken-
ing opportunities for trade routes, as well as exploitation 
of living and non-living resources. The environmental 
state-change is also introducing inherent risks of politi-
cal, economic, and cultural instability, as well as ecosys-
tem impacts beyond anything previously experienced by 
humans in the region. The fact that these opportunities and 
risks are occurring on the time scale of years rather than 
decades makes them matters of urgency (Berkman and 
Vylegzhanin, 2013).
Societal Need for Arctic Observing Networks
Historically, the boundaries of the Arctic Ocean system 
have been the seafloor, the surrounding land areas, and its 
permanent sea ice, with inflow and outflow from the North 
Pacific and North Atlantic. This marine system effectively 
turns on and off with seasonal solar forcing constrained 
by tilt of the Earth’s axis, which is why the Arctic Circle is 
at 66.5º N. This astronomical boundary provides the only 
unambiguous, consistent, and objective delimitation of the 
Arctic Ocean with its surrounding states and Indigenous 
peoples (Fig. 2). 
The resulting oceanography and meteorology of the Arc-
tic Ocean directly influence natural ecosystems (Fig. 3a) 
and adjacent human populations in the surrounding coastal 
states of Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federa-
tion, and the United States, as well as in the non-coastal 
states of Finland and Sweden (Fig. 3b). 
Dynamics of the Arctic Ocean system also influence 
institutions with diverse remits in this maritime region. 
Recently, stimulated by the environmental state-change 
in the Arctic Ocean (Fig. 1), the Arctic states have begun 
to adopt binding agreements in conjunction with their 
biennial ministerial meetings through the Arctic Council 
(Fig. 3c). These include the Agreement on Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arc-
tic (SAR; Arctic Council, 2011; Fig. 3c) and the Agreement 
on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness 
and Response in the Arctic (MOPP; Arctic Council, 2013). 
Through the International Maritime Organization, the 
international community has also adopted a binding polar 
code for shipping that applies specifically to the Arctic 
(Fig. 3d), as well as to the Antarctic (IMO, 2015).
In addition, activities in the Arctic Ocean are influenced 
by institutions with remits beyond the region, for exam-
ple, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS, 1982; Fig. 4a, b). Navigational areas and mete-
orological areas (Fig. 4c), as well as environmental and fish-
eries conventions, also include the Arctic Ocean (Fig. 4d). 
FIG. 1. Environmental state-change in the Arctic Ocean. (a) Arctic sea-ice composition changes in March (when sea-ice extent is maximal each year) from 1983 
to 2014, revealing that multi-year sea ice has been replaced by first-year sea ice, which now dominates in the Arctic Ocean. (b) September 2014 distribution of 
sea-ice age classes (colors shown in Fig. 1a), revealing that most older sea ice remains next to North America with open water extending from the Bering Strait 
to the Barents Sea along the Northern Sea Route adjacent to Russia. Images from NSIDC (2014).
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It is noteworthy that the SAR (Arctic Council, 2011) 
and MOPP (Arctic Council, 2013) agreements both rep-
resent unfunded mandates for the Arctic states that will 
require shared infrastructure that does not yet exist. For 
sustainable development purposes, infrastructure is herein 
defined as the combination of fixed, mobile, and other 
built assets (including communications, research, observ-
ing and information systems) and regulatory, policy, and 
other governance mechanisms (including insurance). Such 
infrastructure, which will be critical for operational deci-
sion making, relates directly to fixed, mobile, and remote 
observing systems in and around the Arctic Ocean. More-
over, a network of observing systems will provide real-
time data and model predictions that will be essential for 
the Arctic states to allocate their response resources cost- 
effectively and efficiently to urgencies that require their 
shared stewardship.
Implications of the environmental state-change in the 
Arctic Ocean relate to all human activities and natural 
ecosystems in the region. To both understand and respond 
to the impacts of the environmental state-change in the 
Arctic Ocean, it is essential to have accurate, timely, and 
repeatable measurements of the geophysical, chemical, and 
biological dynamics of this pan-Arctic system. Such meas-
urements will require a stable and continuously operat-
ing network of instruments across the entire Arctic Ocean 
region, which in turn will depend on logistics and financial 
support especially from the Arctic states.
This paper identifies the challenge to sustain Arctic 
observing networks as essential infrastructure elements 
that will facilitate informed decision making for “sustain-
able development and environmental protection,” which 
are the “common Arctic issues” established by the Arctic 
states and Indigenous peoples (Ottawa Declaration, 1996). 
Sustainable development is herein defined in terms of bal-
ancing environmental protection, economic prosperity, 
social equity, and public welfare over time in view of the 
urgencies of present generations and the needs of future 
generations. Sustainable development further involves bal-
ance between national interests and common interests to 
maintain geopolitical stability for the Arctic region, with-
out which the necessary international investment, coordi-
nation, and consistent application among nations will be 
inadequate for any shared infrastructure. 
Objectives in this paper are to (1) provoke discussion 
about SAON among diverse Arctic stakeholders; (2) illus-
trate the international, interdisciplinary, and inclusive (i.e., 
holistic) relevance of SAON; and (3) briefly reveal examples 
of options that can be considered in greater depth to support 
the long-term implementation of SAON. 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
IN THE ARCTIC REGION
Background Considerations for SAON
The Arctic region entered into a sustainable development 
phase (Fig. 5) with the visionary speech by Soviet Presi-
dent Mikhail Gorbachev (1987), who proposed an “Arctic 
Research Council,” as well as environmental protection 
and international cooperation in the Arctic. Building on 
these proposals at the end of the Cold War, the eight Arctic 
states initiated the International Arctic Science Committee 
(IASC) in 1990, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strat-
egy (1991), and finally, the Arctic Council (Ottawa Declara-
tion, 1996). 
Whether the impacts are local or global, sustainable 
development of the Arctic will involve informed decision 
making, with sufficient details about the “pressures and 
drivers of change [and] the current state of the system, as 
well as identifying the key indicators that will mark sys-
temic and potential detrimental changes, before the appro-
priate responses and actions are devised and implemented” 
(Bock, 2013:40). Understanding these drivers and indica-
tors will require implementation of observational networks 
that are continuously and objectively collecting diverse data 
in a shared manner. 
As a high-level forum, the Arctic Council has pro-
vided an umbrella framework for its six working groups 
to observe, assess, and synthesize data into a wide vari-
ety of targeted research reports (Arctic Council, 2015). 
With SAON, the Arctic Council already has recognized 
that a necessary component of sustainable development is 
the built infrastructure for observing and interpreting the 
FIG. 2. Earth-system boundary configuration covering the Arctic Ocean in 
view of the astronomical position of the Arctic circle at 66.5˚ N latitude (white 
line), based on 23.5˚ tilt of the Earth’s axis, with inflow and outflow from 
the North Pacific and North Atlantic. Also shown are the surrounding Arctic 
coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation and 
United States), non-coastal states (Finland and Sweden) and circumpolar 
presence of Indigenous peoples.
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dynamics of Arctic systems on a pan-Arctic scale (Arctic 
Council, 2009; SAON, 2011). 
Holistic Relevance of SAON 
Objective observational data underlying the risks and 
opportunities in the Arctic region are relevant to the Arc-
tic states and Indigenous peoples, as well as to non-Arctic 
states, international government institutions, non-govern-
mental organizations, and corporations (Fig. 6). While the 
Arctic states and Indigenous peoples are at the core, in real-
ity, all of these stakeholder-types are already involved in 
decision making about the Arctic region.
Today, more than a dozen organizations have remits 
specifically in the Arctic region, involving more than 50 
nations (Table 1). Among the organizations, the Arctic 
Council (Ottawa Declaration, 1996) has a pivotal role as 
the high-level forum for the Arctic region; it includes all 
eight Arctic states and six Indigenous peoples’ organiza-
tions. All Arctic states are also included in the following 
institutions, listed by the year of their formation: Treaty 
Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, 1920; Inter-
national Arctic Science Committee, 1990; the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council, 1993; Conference of Parliamentar-
ians of the Arctic Region, 1993; Forum of Arctic Research 
Operators, 1998; North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, 2007; 
FIG. 3. Arctic biophysical, socio-economic and institutional boundary configurations covering the Arctic Ocean. (a) Large Marine Ecosystems with boundaries 
in yellow (AMSA, 2009); (b) Human development boundary for the Arctic region in red (AHDR, 2004); (c) Search and rescue areas of the Arctic states (Arctic 
Council, 2011); and (d) Arctic boundary for the binding International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), showing the map from earlier 
guidelines (IMO, 2009). Modified from Berkman and Vylegzhanin (2013).
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Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue in the Arctic, 2011; and Agreement on 
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic, 2013. Each Arctic organization 
(Table 1) has its own history of decision making, reflecting 
an evolving “ecosystem” of international policies, which 
has been interpreted partially in a pan-Arctic context (e.g., 
Koivurova and Molenaar, 2009). 
Since the Arctic region entered into a sustainable devel-
opment phase (Fig. 5), a consistent thread of international 
policy development has been the ministerial declarations 
from the Arctic Council, all of which have relied on anal-
yses of observational data. Most poignantly, observational 
data about the environmental state-change (Fig. 1) and its 
diverse implications (e.g., PAME, 2013) have awakened 
global interest in the Arctic Ocean. 
Since observations of the sea-ice minimum in 2007 
(NSIDC, 2007), policy development for the Arctic region 
has been accelerating at national and international levels 
(Fig. 5). This acceleration of policies also coincided with 
FIG. 4. Boundary configurations covering the Arctic Ocean from institutions with remits beyond the region. (a) Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) boundaries 
based on the seafloor with sovereign areas and outer continental shelf claims of the surrounding coastal states (different colors) from IBRU (2008); (b) Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) boundaries based on the overlying water column, emphasizing the high seas (dark blue), which is an inviolate international space that 
exists unambiguously in the central Arctic Ocean surrounded by exclusive economic zones (light blue) from Berkman and Young (2009). (c) Meteorological 
and navigational areas throughout the world ocean, including the Arctic Ocean (IHO, 2009; IMO, 2011); (d) Boundaries of the OSPAR (1992) and NEAF (1980) 
conventions in the northeast Atlantic sector of the Arctic Ocean to the North Pole. Modified from Berkman and Vylegzhanin (2013).
94 • P.A. BERKMAN
the Russian flag planting on the seabed at the North Pole 
(Chivers, 2007) and the subsequent declaration by five Arc-
tic coastal states about their “sovereignty, sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction” in the Arctic Ocean (Ilulissat Declaration, 
2008). 
However, the overriding stimulus for policy develop-
ment and accelerating interest in the Arctic Ocean (Fig. 5) 
is economic opportunity. In the short term, over the next 
3 – 5 decades, there may be billions of barrels of oil and tril-
lions of cubic feet of natural gas to exploit north of the Arc-
tic Circle (Gautier et al., 2009). Over the longer term, Arctic 
trade routes may become significant on a global scale, even 
in relation to traffic through the Panama and Suez Canals 
(AMSA, 2009). Urgency to promote sustainable develop-
ment of energy and shipping activities in the Arctic Ocean 
is reflected in the binding agreements that are emerging 
through the Arctic Council (Arctic Council, 2011, 2013). 
The challenge is to balance national interests and 
common interests (Fig. 7) and respond effectively to 
the opportunities, as well as the risks, generated by the 
environmental state-change in the Arctic Ocean (Figs. 1a, 
b). A key to achieving this international and interdisciplinary 
balance will be to involve the diverse stakeholders 
(Figs. 2 – 7, Table 1) in sustainable infrastructure development, 
as well as maritime domain awareness (IMO, 2010). 
The common infrastructure component for all involved 
could be the pan-Arctic implementation of SAON. Com-
pared to port facilities and ships, SAON would be among 
FIG. 5. Sustainable development phase of the Arctic. Shown is a timeline of Arctic-relevant policy documents that have emerged since the visionary speech 
of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (1987). Color schemes of international (below the timeline) and national (above the timeline) Arctic policies simply 
represent documents that are similar in jurisdiction, scope or concept, including: national Arctic strategies; Arctic Council declarations among the Arctic states 
and Indigenous peoples; guidelines from the International Maritime Organization (IMO); or policies from the European Union. Production of policy documents 
has been accelerating at national and international levels since the Ilulissat Declaration (2008). 
FIG. 6. Concentric levels of responsibilities to manage human activities in 
the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic coastal states, Arctic non-coastal states and 
six Indigenous peoples organizations (Fig. 2) were original signatories to the 
Ottawa Declaration (1996) that established the Arctic Council. Interactions 
with non-Arctic states and non-state actors, especially industry, reflect the 
interplay of global civil society in the Arctic Ocean. Adapted from Berkman 
(2010).
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TABLE 1. International participation in Arctic organizations and information networks (updated from Berkman and Vylegzhanin, 2013). 
Among the 52 states in the table, the eight Arctic states are shaded. The organizations in bold include all of the Arctic states.
 Arctic organization1 
States AC2  AMEC BEAC3 FARO IASC MOPP NACG NAFO4 NC NEAF4 NF OSPAR PB SAR SCAP4 SPIT NATO5
Afghanistan                X  
Albania                X X
Argentina                X  
Australia                X  
Austria    X            X  
Belgium6       X     X    X X
Bulgaria6                X X
Canada X  X X X X X X  X X  X X X X X
Chile                X  
China X    X X           X  
Croatia                 X
Cuba        X          
Czech Republic6    X X           X X
Denmark6,7 X  X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X
Dominican Republic                X  
Egypt                X  
Estonia6       X         X X
Finland6 X  X X X X X  X   X  X X X  
France6 X  X X X  X X    X    X X
Germany6 X  X X X  X     X    X X
Greece6                X X
Hungary6                X X
Iceland X  X X X X X X X X X X   X X X X
India X    X           X  
Ireland6       X     X      
Italy6 X   X X X           X X
Japan  X  X X X   X   X     X  
Latvia6       X          X
Lithuania       X          X
Luxembourg6            X     X
Monaco                X  
Netherlands6 X  X X X  X     X    X X
New Zealand          X      X  
Norway  X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X
Poland6 X  X X X  X         X X
Portugal6       X     X    X X
Republic of Korea  X    X X   X   X       
Romania                X X
Russian Federation X X X X X X X X  X X  X X X X  
Saudi Arabia                X  
Singapore X                 
Slovakia                 X
Slovenia                 X
South Africa                 X 
Spain6 X    X  X     X X X
St. Kitt and Nevis          X        
Sweden6 X  X X X X X  X   X  X X X  
Switzerland     X       X    X  
Turkey                 X
Ukraine        X          
United Kingdom6 X X X X X  X     X    X X
United States X X X X X X X X     X X X X X
Venezuela                X  
Number of states 20 4 15 19 21 8 20 12 5 7  5 15 5 8 8 40 28
 1  AC = Arctic Council (1996); AMEC = Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Programme (1996); BEAC = Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council (1993); FARO = Forum of Arctic Research Operators (1998); IASC = International Arctic Science Committee (1990); MOPP 
= Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013); NACG = North Atlantic Coast 
Guard Forum (2007); NAFO = Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (1978); NATO = 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949); NC = Nordic Council (1952); NEAF = Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in 
North-East Atlantic Fisheries (1980); NF = Northern Forum (1991); OSPAR = Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
of the North-East Atlantic (1992); PB = Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (1973); SAR = Agreement on Cooperation 
on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011); SCAP = Standing Committee of the Conference of Arctic 
Parliamentarians (1994), SPIT = Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, and Protocol (1920). 
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the least expensive infrastructure elements to sustain. 
Moreover, SAON would build on current research activities 
and funding, enabling governments to readily contribute to 
sustainable development of the Arctic, particularly in the 
Arctic Ocean (UNESCO, 2009).
Law of the Sea for Sustainability in the Arctic Ocean 
In their central role (Fig. 6), the Arctic coastal states 
“remain committed” to the Law of the Sea (Ilulissat Dec-
laration, 2008), which is a universal jurisdictional frame-
work that is accepted by Arctic and non-Arctic states alike. 
Law of the Sea zones (Figs. 4a, 4b, 7), which are defined 
by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS, 1982), are accepted because nations have either 
ratified this convention or accepted the zones under custom-
ary international law, as is the case with the United States. 
Law of the Sea zones apply throughout the world ocean 
without geographic or thematic emphasis, revealing a 
national-international gradient of jurisdictions (Fig. 7). 
National jurisdictions range from the coastal boundary 
to the edge of the exclusive economic zone in the water 
column and across the continental shelf on the seafloor. 
Beyond the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf 
are the international spaces of the high seas and the deep 
sea, respectively (Berkman et al., 2011). 
With regard to the Arctic Ocean (Berkman and Young, 
2009), beyond any sovereign rights that coastal states may 
have on the seafloor, even to the North Pole, there always 
will be high seas where the international community has 
rights and responsibilities (Figs. 4b, 7). Consequently, the 
Law of the Sea provides the justification and framework 
for Arctic and non-Arctic states to coordinate, support, 
and share infrastructure for sustainable development in the 
Arctic Ocean. Such an infrastructure will require capac-
ity to respond to impacts and resources that either cross or 
extend beyond the boundaries of the coastal states. Marine 
scientific research (UNCLOS, 1982) such as the research 
that would be implemented by SAON provides the inclusive 
pathway to address these transboundary issues. 
CONCLUSIONS
The Arctic is now experiencing some of the most rapid 
and severe climate change on earth. Over the next 
100 years, climate change is expected to accelerate, 
contributing to major physical, ecological, social, and 
economic changes, many of which have already begun. 
(ACIA, 2004:10)
SAON represents an opportunity to initiate sustainable 
infrastructure development in the Arctic Ocean, as a practi-
cal and cost-effective first step that can be inclusive on an 
international scale. The reality is, however, that SAON will 
require funding as well as technical expertise, as described 
in the plan for the implementation phase of SAON (2011:6): 
“Other than the Secretariat functions, which are provided 
by AMAP and by IASC, all other SAON activities are to 
be funded by the participants or by financial sponsors in 
response to proposals from the participants.”
The above scope for funding SAON is vague and 
impractical at an integrated international and pan-Arctic 
scale. To provoke discussion about how to sustain SAON, 
three options for effective funding are introduced here:
Option 1: Arctic coastal states, as part of their leasehold 
agreements with major energy companies that seek to 
 2  In addition to the eight Arctic Member States of the Arctic Council and the 12 non-Arctic Observer states listed in the table, there are six 
permanent participants from Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations (Arctic Athabaskan Council, Aleut International Association, 
Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North, and Saami Council). The 
Arctic Council also involves nine intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations (International Federation of Red Cross 
& Red Crescent Societies, International Union for the Conservation of Nature, Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordic Environment 
Finance Corporation, North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations Development Program, United Nations Environment Program) 
as well as eleven non-governmental organizations (Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas, Arctic Circumpolar Gateway, 
Association of World Reindeer Herders, Circumpolar Conservation Union, International Arctic Science Committee, International 
Arctic Social Sciences Association, International Union for Circumpolar Health, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 
Northern Forum, University of the Arctic, World Wide Fund for Nature-Global Arctic Program). The European Union has applied 
to the Arctic Council for Permanent Observer status. In addition, the Arctic Council involves expert groups and task forces along 
with its six working groups: Arctic Contaminant Action Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), 
Conservation of Arctic Fauna and Flora (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment (PAME), and Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).
 3 The Barents Euro-Arctic Council has seven permanent members, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Russian 
Federation, and the European Commission, and other states participate as observers.
 4 Includes European Economic Community or European Union.
 5 It is a question whether NATO, like other North Atlantic organizations (e.g., NACG, NAFO, NEAF, OSPAR) has an Arctic remit.
 6 Member of European Union. 
 7 Includes Greenland (which is not a member of the European Union) and the Faroe Islands as autonomous areas.
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extract hydrocarbons from the seafloor within sovereign 
jurisdictions, should require energy companies to sup-
port sustainable infrastructure development in the Arctic 
Ocean as a cost of business, with funding earmarked for 
SAON.
Option 2: In addition to the Arctic states with their “stew-
ardship” roles in the Arctic Ocean (Ilulissat Declaration, 
2008), non-Arctic states that are admitted as observers 
to the Arctic Council should commit funding to SAON. 
Option 3: Some level of public-private coordination could 
be developed among the diverse institutions and organi-
zations with Arctic interests (Figs. 3 and 4, Table 1) to 
support SAON for informed decision making about their 
activities in the Arctic Ocean.
In addition to geospatial data to support decisions about 
positioning built infrastructure in and around the Arc-
tic Ocean, SAON will be necessary for operational deci-
sion making about responses to commercial impacts and 
activities in the Arctic Ocean. Such response capacity is 
a requirement for the Arctic states in binding agreements 
(e.g., Arctic Council, 2011, 2013), for point emergencies 
(e.g., rescue of persons from a sinking ship), and transitory 
impacts (e.g., clean-up of an oil or gas spill).
There are many uncertainties about how to balance 
the diverse interests (Figs. 2 – 7, Table 1) and capabilities 
for responding to the emerging risks and opportunities in 
the Arctic. “What is clear, however, is that changes in the 
region’s physical environment are likely to present policy 
planners and political decision-makers with a wide array 
of challenges that will require extraordinary measures at 
the national as well as at the regional and international lev-
els” (Åtland 2013:213). Among the challenges is planning 
an integrated pan-Arctic infrastructure to accommodate 
global activities in the Arctic Ocean, not just for the Arctic 
states and Indigenous peoples, but for the whole world. 
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into a ‘knowledge bank’ (http://aos2013.knohow.co) to facilitate 
comprehensive discovery of content-in-context relationships 
across the AOS 2013 collection and to preserve access to the 
original PDF (portable document format) files. This manuscript 
has been prepared with support from Arctic Options: Holistic 
Integration for Arctic Coastal Marine Sustainability, with 
funding from the National Science Foundation, Division of Polar 
Programs (Grant No. PLR-1263819). 
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